BlendCAC: A BLockchain-ENabled Decentralized Capability-based Access
  Control for IoTs by Xu, Ronghua et al.
BlendCAC: A BLockchain-ENabled Decentralized
Capability-based Access Control for IoTs
Ronghua Xu, Yu Chen
Binghamton University, SUNY
Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
{rxu22, ychen}@binghamton.edu
Erik Blasch
US Air Force Research Laboratory
Rome, NY 13441, USA
erik.blasch@gmail.com
Genshe Chen
Intelligent Fusion Technology, Inc.
Germantown, MD 20876, USA
gchen@intfusiontech.com
Abstract—The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoTs) allows
heterogeneous embedded smart devices to collaboratively pro-
vide smart services with or without human intervention. While
leveraging the large-scale IoT-based applications like Smart Gird
or Smart Cities, IoTs also incur more concerns on privacy
and security. Among the top security challenges that IoTs
face, access authorization is critical in resource sharing and
information protection. One of the weaknesses in today’s access
control (AC) is the centralized authorization server, which can
be the performance bottleneck or the single point of failure.
In this paper, BlendCAC, a blockchain-enabled decentralized
capability-based AC is proposed for the security of IoTs. The
BlendCAC aims at an effective access control processes to devices,
services and information in large scale IoT systems. Based on
the blockchain network, a capability delegation mechanism is
suggested for access permission propagation. A robust identity-
based capability token management strategy is proposed, which
takes advantage of smart contract for registering, propagation
and revocation of the access authorization. In the proposed
BlendCAC scheme, IoT devices are their own master to control
their resources instead of being supervised by a centralized
authority. Implemented and tested on a Raspberry Pi device and
on a local private blockchain network, our experimental results
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed BlendCAC approach
to offer a decentralized, scalable, lightweight and fine-grained
AC solution to IoT systems.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Contract, Decentralized Ac-
cess Control (DAC), Internet of Things (IoTs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoTs),
more and more smart devices are connected to the Internet at
an unprecedented scale. The prevalence of the IoTs changes
human activities by pervasively providing applications and
services revolutionizing transportation, healthcare, industrial
automation, and emergency response [6]. These capabilities
enable both situational awareness (SAW) and information
fusion based on uninterrupted, ubiquitous, real-time data flows,
which provide essential contextual information for delay-
sensitive, mission-critical applications [9], [11], [12], [29].
While benefiting from the large-scale applications like
Smart Gird and Smart Cities, highly connective smart IoT
devices with insufficient security enforcement incur more
concerns on security and privacy. Security issues, such as
privacy, authentication, access control, system configuration,
information storage and management, are among the top
challenges in today’s IoT environment [7].
One of the top security concerns that IoTs face is access
control (AC). Access authorization is particularly critical in
resource and information protection. Conventional AC ap-
proaches, such as the Access Control List (ACL), the Role-
based Access Control (RBAC) and the Attribute-based Access
Control (ABAC), have been widely used in IT systems.
However, they are not able to provide a scalable, manageable
and efficient mechanism to meet new challenges raised by IoT
networks:
1) Scalability: The fast growing number of devices and
services also pose increasing management workload to
AC systems. AC strategies are expected to be able to
handle the scalability problem resulting from the large
scale IoT networks.
2) Heterogeneity: IoT systems normally integrate hetero-
geneous computing nodes and other physical devices
with variant underlying technologies or in different
application domains, and each domain or platform has
its own specific requirements for identity authentication
and authorization policy enforcement.
3) Causality: The traditional RBAC and ABAC systems
envisage planned and long-lived patterns, while the IoT
world is mainly characterized by short-lived, with causal
and/or spontaneous interactions [17], in which the AC
scheme is required to dynamically respond.
4) Lightweight: IoT devices are usually resource-
constrained, which implies the lack of capability to
support computing intensive tasks or large storage
required applications. meanwhile, the smart devices
connect to each other by low power and lossy networks.
Consequently the AC protocols should be lightweight
and not impose significant overhead on devices and
communication networks.
The extraordinary large number of devices with heterogene-
ity and dynamics necessitate a more scalable, flexible and
lightweight AC mechanism for IoT networks. In addition, a
majority of the AC solutions rely on centralized authorities.
Although the delegation mechanism helps migrate certain
intelligence from the centralized cloud server to a near-site
fog or edge network, the power of policy decision making and
identity management is exclusively located in the cloud center.
IoT networks need a new AC framework that provides decen-
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tralized authentication and authorization schemes in trustless
application network environments, such that intelligence could
be diffused among large number of distributed edge devices.
While being well-known as the fundamental protocol of
Bitcoin [22], the first digital currency, the blockchain protocol
has been recognized as the potential to revolutionize the
fundamentals of IT technology because of its many attrac-
tive features and characteristics such as supporting decen-
tralization and anonymity maintenance [13]. In this paper, a
BLockchain-ENabled, Decentralized, Capability-based Access
Control (BlendCAC) scheme is proposed to enhance the
security of IoTs. It provides a scalable, fine-grained, and
lightweight AC solution to protect smart devices, services
and information in IoT networks. An identity-based capability
token management strategy is presented and the authorization
delegation mechanism is illustrated. A capability-based access
validation process is implemented on service providers that
integrate situational awareness (SAW) and customized con-
textualized conditions. Experimental results demonstrate the
feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed AC scheme.
The major contributions of this work are:
1) A complete architecture of capability-based authorization
is proposed, which includes capability management, del-
egation propagation, and access right validation.
2) A concept-proof prototype based on smart contracts is
implemented and deployed on a local private blockchain
network.
3) A comprehensive experimental study has been conducted
that compares the proposed BlendCAC scheme with the
well-known RBAC and ABAC models. The experimental
results validate the feasibility of the BlendCAC scheme
in IoT environments without introducing significant over-
head.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II analyzes and reviews the state of the art research in access
control for IoT systems. Section III illustrates the details
of the proposed BlendCAC system. Beside the implemen-
tation of the proof-of-concept prototype, Section IV reports
an extensive experimental study using test scenarios that are
run on both resource-constrained and non-resource-constrained
devices. Finally, a summary wraps up this paper in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND RELATED WORK
A. Access Control in IoTs
Technologies for authentication and authorization of access
to certain resources or services are among the main elements
to protect the security and privacy for IoT devices [24]. As
a fundamental mechanism to enable security in computer
systems, AC is the process that decides who is authorized to
have what communication rights on which objects with respect
to some security models and policies [15]. An effective AC
system should satisfy the main security requirements, such
as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, recently
raised security and privacy issues in the era of IoTs require that
AC systems should be built on principals of high scalability,
flexibility, lightweight and causality.
There are various AC methods and solutions with different
objectives proposed to address security challenges in IoTs.
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [26] provides
a framework that species user access authorization to resources
based on roles, and supports principals such as least privilege,
partition of administrative functions and separation of duties
[25]. However, a pure RBAC model presents a role explosion
problem, which is inappropriate to implement security policies
that require interpreting complex and ambiguous IoT scenar-
ios. The RBAC model implemented on IoTs adopts a Web
of Things (WoTs) approach to implement AC policies on the
smart objects via the web service [14], [30], and the RBAC
model was extended by introducing context constraints to
consider contextual awareness in AC decisions [37]. However,
those proposals are not able to clearly specify the fine-grained
AC on variant resources or services, like the mapping of the
role notion and device-to-device communication.
To address the weaknesses of RBAC model in a highly
distributed network environment, an Attribute-based Access
Control (ABAC) [28], [36] is introduced in IoT networks to
reduce the number of rules resulting from role explosion. In
ABAC the AC policies are defined through directly associating
attributes with subjects. An efficient authentication and ABAC
based authorization scheme for the perception layer of IoTs
have been proposed [35]. Based on user attribute certificates,
an access right is granted by AC authority to ensure fine-
grained access control. However, specifying a consistent def-
inition of the attributes within a domain or across different
domains could significantly increase effort and complexity
on policy management as the number of devices grow, and
hence, the attribute-based proposal is not suitable for large
scale distributed IoT networks.
Due to drawbacks that exist in traditional access con-
trol models such as RBAC and ABAC, the requirements
imposed by IoT scenarios cannot be satisfied. Given many
great advantages from an IoT perspective, such as scalability,
flexibility, distributed, user-driven, IoT systems can support
delegation and revocation [24]. Capability-based access con-
trol approaches have been considered a promising solution to
IoTs. The Access Control Matrix (ACM) model represents
a good conceptualization of authorizations by providing a
framework for describing discretionary access control (DAC)
[25]. As two implementations of ACM, Access Control List
(ACL) and Capability are widely used in authorization system.
In the ACL model, each object is associated with an access
control list that saves the subjects and their access rights for
the objects.
The ACL is a centralized approach to support administrative
activities with better traceability by implementing AC strate-
gies on cloud servers [20]. However, as the number of subjects
and resources increases, confused duty problems are identified
in ACL and access rules become much more complex to
manage. Due to the centralized management property, ACL
cannot provide multiple levels of granularity, is not scalable
and is vulnerable to single point of failure. Meanwhile, in the
capability model, each subject is associated with a capability
list that represents its access rights to all concerned objects.
The CapAC has been implemented in many large scale IoT-
based projects, like IoT@Work [16].
Although capability-based methods have been used as a
feature in many access control solutions for the IoT-based
applications, applying the original concept of capability-based
access control model in IoT network has raised several issues,
like capability propagation and revocation [15]. To tackle
these challenges, a Secure Identity-Based Capability (SICAP)
System is proposed, which enables the monitoring, mediating,
and recording of capability propagations to enforce security
policies as well as achieving rapid revocation capability by
using an exception list [15]. However, the centralized access
control server (ACS) becomes the performance bottleneck of
the system, and the author didn’t provide a clear illustration on
security policy used in capability generation and propagation,
neither was the context information in making authorization
decision considered.
To enable contextual awareness in federated IoTs, an autho-
rization delegation method is proposed based on a Capability-
based Context-Aware Access Control (CCAAC) model [8]. By
introducing a delegation mechanism to capability generation
and propagation process, the CCAAC model shows great
advantages to address scalability and heterogeneity issues in
IoT networks. Given the requirement that a prior knowledge of
the trust relationship among domains in federated IoTs must
be established, however, the proposed approach is not suit-
able universally for all IoT application scenarios. Inspired by
the SUN DIGITAL ECOSYSTEM ENVIRONMENT project
[27], a capability-based access control (CapAC) model was
proposed that adopted a centralized approach for managing
access control policy [17]. However, the proposed CapAC
scheme depended on a centralized authority and did not
consider the lightweight requirement at the smart device side.
To address the limitations in CapAC, a Distributed Capability-
based Access Control (DCapAC) model was proposed, which
was directly deployed on resource-constrained devices [18],
[19]. The DCapAC allows smart devices to autonomously
make decisions on access rights based on authorization policy,
and it shows advantages in scalability and interoperability.
However, capability revocation management and delegation
were not discussed, neither were the granularity and context-
awareness considered.
B. Blockchain and Smart Contract
The blockchain is the fundamental framework of Bitcoin
[22], which was introduced by Nakamoto in 2008. The
blockchain is the public ledger that allows the data be
recorded, stored and updated distributively. By its nature,
the blockchain is a decentralized architecture such that does
not rely on a centralized authority anymore. The transactions
are approved and recorded in blocks by miners, and the
blocks are appended to the blockchain in a chronological
order. Blockchain uses consensus mechanism to maintain the
sanctity of the data recorded on the blocks. Thanks to the
trustless proof mechanism enforced through mining task on
miners across network, users can trust the system of the public
ledger stored worldwide on many different decentralized nodes
maintained by ”miner-accountants,” as opposed to having to
establish and maintain trust with the transaction counter-
party or a third-party intermediary [31]. Blockchain is the
ideal architecture to ensure distributed transactions between
all participants in a trustless environment.
Because of many attractive characteristics, blockchain tech-
nology has been investigated to offer a decentralized AC
scheme in trustless network environments. A blockchain based
AC is proposed to publish AC policy and to allow distributed
transfer access right among users on bitcoin network [21].
The proposal allows distributed auditability, preventing a third
party from fraudulently denying the rights granted by an
enforceable policy. However, the solution still rely on an
external centralized policy database to fetch access right given
the links stored in the blockchain, and the experimental results
are not provided. Based on blockchain technology, FairAccess
is proposed to offer a fully decentralized pseudonymous and
privacy preserving authorization management framework for
IoTs [23]. In FairAccess, AC policies are enclosed in new
types of transactions that are used to grant, get, delegate,
and revoke access. However, the scripting language used in
Bitcoin allows to transcode two types of AC policies, so that
the proposed framework cannot support more complex and
granular access control model.
Blockchain has shown its success in decentralization of
currency and payments, like Bitcoin. Currently designing a
programmable money and contracts, which support variety
of customized transaction types become a trend to extend
blockchain application beyond cryptocurrency. Smart contract,
which emerges from the smart property, is a method of using
blockchain to achieve agreement among parties, as opposed
to rely on third parties for maintaining a trust relationship.
By using cryptographic and other security mechanisms, smart
contract combines protocols with user interfaces to formal-
ize and secure relationships over computer networks [32].
Smart contract is essential a collection of defined instructions
and data that have been recorded at a specific address of
blockchain. Through encapsulating operational logic as a
bytecode and performing Turing complete computation on
distributed miners, a smart contract allows user to transcode
more complex business models as new types of transactions
on a blockchain network. Smart contract provides a promising
solution to implement more flexible and fine-grained AC
models on blockchain networks.
III. BLENDCAC: A BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED
DECENTRALIZED CAPAC
In order to address the issues discussed in Section II,
the authors recently proposed a Federated Capability-based
Access Control model (FedCAC) [33]. FedCAC addresses
scalability, granularity, and dynamicity challenges in access
control strategy for IoTs. Through delegating part of the iden-
tify authentication and authorization task to domain delegator,
workload of the centralized policy decision making center
Fig. 1. Illustration of the BlendCAC System Architecture.
(PDC) is reduced. Migrating some processing validation tasks
to local devices helps the FedCAC to be lighter and context-
awareness enabled. Involving smart objects in access right
authorization process allows device-to-device communication,
which implies better scalability and interoperability in IoT
network environment. However, it is essentially still a cen-
tralized AC scheme, such that weaknesses include being the
single-point of failure and performance bottleneck, are still not
solved.
Inspired by the smart contract and blockchain technology, a
decentralized capability-based access control framework for
IoTs, called BlendCAC, is proposed in this paper, and a
prototype of proposal has been implemented in a physical IoT
network environment to verify the efficiency and effectiveness.
The next subsection provides a comprehensive system design
of BlendCAC framework. Unlike the approaches discussed
above, BlendCAC, effectively provides scalability, granularity,
and dynamicity of AC strategies for IoTs. Through encapsu-
lating AC policies into a Smart Contract, which is deployed
across the blockchain network, users are the master of their
own data or devices instead of being supervised or controlled
by a third party authority. Enforcing authorization and access
right verification among large number of distributed edge
devices allows more coordination on edge networks.
A. System Architecture of BlendCAC
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed BlendCAC system archi-
tecture, which intends to function in a scenario including two
isolated IoT-based service domains without pre-establishing a
trust relationship. In each domain, the domain owner, who has
the ownership of devices, enforces predefined security policies
to manage domain related devices and services. Operation and
communication mode is listed as follow:
1) Registration: All entities must create at least one main
account defined by a pair of keys to join the blockchain
network. Each account is indexed by its address that
is derived from his/her own public key. In our scenario,
the domain owner maintains a local profile database that
provides identity authentication and management. Once
the identity information related to users or IoT devices
is verified, the profile of each registered entity is cre-
ated by using his/her address for authentication process
when an access right request happens. As a result, the
domain owners are able to define authorization policies
and perform decision-making to directly control their
own devices or resources instead of depending on third
parties.
2) Smart Contract Deployment: A smart contract, which
manages capability tokens, must be developed and de-
ployed on the blockchain network by the domain owner.
Thanks to cryptographic and security mechanisms pro-
vided by blockchain network, smart contracts can secure
any algorithmically specifiable protocols and relation-
ships from malicious interference by third parties under
trustless network environment. After synchronizing the
blochchain data, all nodes could access all transactions
and recent state of each smart contract by referring
local chain data. Each node interacts with the smart
contract through the provided contract address and the
RPC interface.
3) Capability Propagation: To successfully access services
or resources at service providers, an entity initially sends
an access right request to the domain owner to get a
capability token. Given the registered entity information
established in the profile database, a policy decision
making module evaluates the access request by enforc-
ing the predefined authorization policies. If the access
request is granted, the domain owner issues the capa-
bility token encoded the access right, then launches a
transaction to update the token data in the smart contract.
After the transaction has been approved and recorded in
a new block, the domain owner notifies the entity with
a smart contract address for the querying token data.
Otherwise, the access right request is rejected.
4) Authorization Validation: The authorization validation
process is performed at the local service providers on
receiving a service request from the entity. Through
regularly synchronizing the local chain data with the
blockchain network, a domain owner just simply checks
the current state of the contract in the local chain to get
a capability token associated with the entity’s address.
Considering the capability token validation and access
authorization process result, if the access right policies
and conditional constraints are satisfied, the service
provider grants the access request and offers services to
the requester. Otherwise, the service request is denied.
To enable a scalable, distributed and fine-grained AC
scheme for IoT networks, the proposed BlendCAC is focused
on three issues: the identity-based capability management, the
access right authorization and the privilege delegation.
B. Capability Token Structure
In the BlendCAC system, the entities are categorized as
subjects and objects. Subjects are defined as entities who
request a service from the service providers, while objects
are referred to entities who offer the resources or services.
Entities could be either human beings or smart devices. In the
profile database, all registered entities are associated with a
globally unique Virtual Identity (VID), which is used as the
prime key for identifying entities’ profile information. As each
entity has at least one main account indexed by its address in
the blockchain network, the blockchain is used to represent
the VID for profiling register entities.
In general, the capability specifies which subject can access
resources of a target object by associating subject, object,
actions and condition constraints. The identity-based capability
structure is defined as follows:
ICap = f(V IDS , V IDO, D,AR,C) (1)
where the parameters are:
• f : a one-way hash mapping function;
• V IDS : the virtual ID of a subject that requests an access
to a service or resource;
• V IDO: the virtual ID of an object that provides a service
or resource;
• D: a set of delegation right, e.g. delegatee and delegation
depth;
• AR: a set of access right for actions, e.g. read, write,
execute; and
• C: a set of context awareness information, such as time,
location.
In the BlendCAC system, an AR is defined as the access
right set. For example, the AR can be {Read}, {Write},
{Read;Write}, or {NULL}. If AR = {NULL}, the opera-
tion conducted on the resource is not allowed. C is defined as a
context constraints set, like C = {C1, C2} or C = {NULL}.
If C = {NULL}, no context constraint is considered in the
access right validation process. The delegation privilege is
defined in set D including delegatee and delegation depth. The
delegatee is defined as an array to queue the delegated entity’s
address, and the delegation depth specifies the maximum
delegation operations.
C. Capability-based Access Right Authorization
Given the defined BlendCAC structure, the capability token
structure and the related operations are transcoded to a smart
contract and deployed on the blockchain network, while the
access right authorization is implemented as a policy-based
decision making service running by the domain owner. As
shown by Fig. 2, a comprehensive capability-based access
right authorization procedure consists of four steps: capability
generation, access right validation, capability delegation and
revocation.
1) Capability Generation: As one type of meta data to
represent the access right, the capability ICap could
be generated by associating a VID with an AR, thus
the ICap has the identified property to prevent forgery.
After receiving access request from user, the domain
owner generates capability token based on predefined
access control policy, and launches transactions to save
a new token data to a smart contract. A large number
of ICap is grouped into the capability pools on smart
contract, which could be proofed and synchronized
among the nodes across the blockchain network.
Fig. 2. Flowchart of the Capability-based Access Right Authorization.
2) Access Right Validation: After receiving the service
request from a subject, the service provider first fetches
the capability token from the smart contract by using
the subject’s address, then makes decision whether or
not to grant an access to the service according to the
local access control policy. Implementing access right
validation at the local service provider allows smart
objects to be involved in the AC decision making task,
which is suitable to offer a flexible and fine-grained AC
service in IoT networks.
3) Capability Delegation: In our proposal, the capability
delegation mechanism is implemented by configuring
delegation set D in the ICap. As the smart contract
has received an update token transaction from the user,
it checks the set D to validate the delegation right. If
the value of delegation depth is more than the count of
elements in delegatee, the user could delegate his/her
capability token to other entity by appending the target
address to delegatee. Otherwise, the capability delega-
tion request is rejected. For each successful delegation
transaction, the length of queue delegatee increases by
1 until reaches the limitation defined by the delegation
depth.
4) Capability Revocation: The capability revocation con-
siders two scenarios: delegation right D revocation and
ICap revocation. In our proposal, only the domain
owner is allowed to perform revocation operation on
a smart contract. In the delegation right revocation
process, the domain owner could remove the addresses
from delegatee to revoke the delegated access right for
certain specific entities. In case of ICap revocation,
through changing delegation depth to zero or clearing
the AR, the capability token becomes unavailable to all
associated entities.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A concept-proof prototype system has been implemented
on a real private Ethereum blockchain network environment.
Compared with other open blockchain platform, like Bitcoin
and Hyperledger, Ethereum has a more matured ecosystem and
is designed to be more adaptable and flexible for development
of smart contract and business logic [1]. The proposed Blend-
CAC model has been transcoded to a smart contract using
Solidity [4], which is a contract-oriented, high-level language
for implementing smart contracts. The access authorization
and validation policy is enforced as a web service application
based on the Flask framework [2] using Python. The Flask
is a micro-framework for Python based on Werkzeug, Jinja
2 and good intentions. The lightweight and extensible micro
architectures make the Flask a preferable web solution on
resource constrained IoT devices.
In order to evaluate the performance and the overhead
of our BlendCAC scheme, two benchmark models, RBAC
and ABAC, are also implemented on the experimental web
service system. All transcoded access control models have the
similar data structure in smart contract except authorization
representation. In RBAC based smart contract, authorization is
defined as the approach to bridge the relationship between user
and permission, while RBAC based smart contract uses user’s
attributes as representative format for authorization. Both the
RBAC and ABAC need a local database, either to maintain
the user-role-permission or to manage the attribute-permission
policy for authorization validation process, the profiles and
policy rules management are developed by using an embedded
SQL database engine, called SQLite [5]. The lower memory
and computation cost make the SQLite an ideal database
solution to resource constrained system, like Raspberry Pi.
A. Environmental Setup
The mining task is performed on a system with stronger
computing power, like a laptop or a desktop. Two miners are
deployed on a laptop, of which the configuration is as follows:
the processor is 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 (8 cores), the RAM
memory is 16 GB and the operating system is Ubuntu 16.04.
And other four miners are distributed to four desktops which
are empowered with the Ubuntu 16.04 OS, 3 GHz Intel Core
TM (2 cores) processor and 4 GB memory. Each miner uses
two CPU cores for mining. The IoT devices are two Raspberry
PI 3 Model B with the configuration as follows: 1.2GHz 64-
bit quad-core ARMv8 CPU, the memory is 1GB LPDDR2-900
SDRAM and the operation system is Raspbian based on the
Linux kernel. Unfortunately, the Raspberry PI is not powerful
enough to function as a miner, so two Raspberry Pi worked
as nodes to join the private blockchain without mining. All
devices use Go-Ethereum [3] as the client application to work
on the blockchain network.
B. Performance Evaluation
In the test scenario, two Raspberry Pi 3 devices are adopted
to play the roles of the client and the service provider respec-
tively. To measure the general cost incurred by the proposed
BlendCAC scheme both on the IoT devices’ processing time
and the network communication delay, 50 test runs have been
conducted based on the proposed test scenario, where the
client sends a data query request to the server for an access
permission. This test scenario is based on an assumption that
the subject has a valid capability token when it performs the
Fig. 3. Computation Time for Each Stage in BlendCAC.
action. Therefore, all steps of authorization validation must
be processed on the server side so that the maximum latency
value is computed.
1) Computational Overhead: According to the results
shown in Fig. 3, the average total delay time required by
the BlendCAC operation of retrieving data from the client to
server is 243 ms, which is almost the same as RBAC or ABAC
does. The total delay includes the round trip time (RTT), time
for querying capability data from the smart contract, time for
parsing JSON data from the request, and time for access right
validation. The token processing task is mainly responsible
for fetching token data from the smart contract and introduces
the highest workload among the authorization operation stages.
Owing to the fact that encapsulating user-role relationship in
the smart contract requires less data than the capability or
attributes does, the RBAC incurred less computational cost
than what BlendCAC and ABAC did in token processing stage.
As the most computing intensive stage, the execution time
of token processing is about 210 ms, which is accounted for
almost 86% of the entire process time.
The entire authorization process is divided into two steps,
token validation and authorization verification, where the
average time of the authorization process is about 0.86 ms
(0.12 ms + 0.74 ms). Compared with token validation pro-
cess, which only simply checks the token valid status, the
authorization verification process requires more computational
power to enforce the local access control policies. Although
the similarity in token data structure allows all the three
access control models have almost the same time in the token
validation stage, the BlendCAC outperforms the RBAC and
ABAC in authorization verification. Since both the RBAC and
ABAC needs a database to either manage user-role-permission
relationship or maintain attributes-permission rules, which in-
evitably incurs time consuming on searching rules in database.
In our experimental study, the RBAC (2.47 ms) and ABAC
(2.07 ms) have much higher processing time than BlendCAC
(0.74 ms).
2) Communication Overhead: Owing to the high overhead
introduced by querying token data from the smart contract
in token processing stage, a token data caching solution is
introduced in the BlendCAC system to reduce network latency.
Fig. 4. Network Latency of BlendCAC.
When the client sends a service request to the server, the
service side extracts cached token data from the local storage
to valid authorization. The service providers regularly update
cached token data by checking smart contract status. The token
synchronization time is in consistence with block generation
time, which is about 15 seconds in the Ethereum blockchain
network. Simulating a regular service request allows us to
measure how long it takes for the client to send a request
and retrieve the data from the server.
Figure 4 shows the overall network latency incurred and
compares the execution time of the BlendCAC with RBAC,
ABAC and a benchmark without any access control en-
forcement. At the beginning, a long delay is observed in
the first service request scenario, in which service provider
communicated with the smart contract and cached the token
data. However, through processing the local cached token data
for authorization validation, the network latency decreases
quickly and becomes stable at a low level during the subse-
quent service requests. The benchmark without access control
enforcement takes an average of 31 ms for fetching requested
data versus that the BlendCAC consumes on average of 36 ms.
It means that the proposed BlendCAC scheme only introduces
about 5 ms extra latency. The overhead in terms of delay is
trivial. As shown by Fig. 4, the BlendCAC also has lower
latency than RBAC and ABAC in most period of time. In
addition, unlike RBAC and ABAC, which rely on the local
policy database as intermediate to valid access right, encoding
access right directly in capability token makes the BlendCAC
more scalable and flexible in the large scale IoT networks.
As the experimental results show, the proposed BlendCAC
scheme introduced a small amount of overhead, both at the
network layer and the local device layer. To measure general
network latency of inter-domain communication, HTTP is exe-
cuted on the same testbed to simulate a regular transaction, like
connects, sends a request and retrieves the reply. Compared
with calculated average network latency that is about 300 ms,
the trade-off in the proposed BlendCAC is acceptable for the
network environments by only incurring 5 ms latency (no
more than 2%). In addition, the test scenarios are based on
Raspberry Pi devices, which belongs to a type of simple board
computer (SBC) with limited computation power and memory
space. It is reasonable to expect a better performance when the
BlendCAC scheme is implemented on more powerful smart
devices, like a smart phone. Although synchronizing cached
token data with the smart contract requires more computational
resource, the transactions of querying smart contract status
are regularly launched by the service providers in a separate
service thread rather than being called in each service request,
so that network overhead over service request communication
is greatly reduced to improve QoS requirement.
C. Discussions
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
BlendCAC strategy is effective and efficient to protecting the
IoT devices from unauthorized access requests. Compared to
centralized CapAC access models, the BlendCAC scheme has
the following advantages:
1) Decentralized authorization: leveraging the blockchain
technique, the proposed BlendCAC scheme allows do-
main owners to control their devices and resource with-
out depending on a centralized third authority to estab-
lish the trust relationship with unknown nodes; instead,
it could define a domain-specific access authorization
policy, which is critical to the scalable, heterogeneous
and dynamic IoT-based applications;
2) Edge computing driven intelligence: thanks to the
blockchain technology, the BlendCAC scheme provides
a device driven access control framework that is suitable
for the distributed nature of IoT environments. Through
transferring power and intelligence from the centralized
cloud server to the edge of network, the risk of per-
formance bottleneck and the single point of failure are
mitigated, and the smart things are capable of protecting
their own resource and privacy by enforcing user-defined
security mechanism;
3) Fine granularity: enforcing access right validation on
local service providers enables the smart devices to
make decisions whether or not to grant access to certain
services according to the local environmental conditions.
Fine-grained access control with the less privilege ac-
cess principle prevents privilege escalation, even if an
attacker steals a capability token; and
4) Lightweight design: compared to the XML-based lan-
guage for access control, such as XACML, JSON is a
lightweight technology that is suitable for the resource
constrained platforms. Given the experimental results,
our JSON based capability token structure introduces
small overhead on the computation and network perfor-
mance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a decentralized capability-based
access control framework leveraging the smart contract and
blockchain technology, called BlendCAC, to handle the chal-
lenges in access control strategies for IoTs. A concept-proof
prototype has been built in a physical IoT network environ-
ment to verify the feasibility of the proposed BlendCAC. The
BlendCAC model is transcoded to smart contracts and works
on the private Ethereum blockchain network. The desktops and
laptops serve as miners to maintain the sanctity of transactions
recorded on the blockchain, while Raspberry PI devices act
as edge computing nodes to access and to provide IoT-based
services. Extensive experimental studies have been conducted
and the results are encouraging. It validated that the BlendCAC
scheme is able to efficiently and effectively enforce access
control authorization and validation in a distributed, trustless
IoT network. This work has demonstrated that our proposed
BlendCAC framework is a promising approach to provide a
scalable, fine-grained and lightweight access control for IoT
networks.
While the reported work has shown a wonderful potential,
there is still a long way to go to build a complete decentralized
security solution for IoTs and edge computing. Deeper insights
are expected. Part of our on-going effort is focused on further
exploration of the blockchain based access control scheme in
real-world applications. Taking the smart surveillance system
as a case study, the proposed BlendCAC will be extended to
protect network cameras and motion sensors in the novel urban
surveillance platform we developed recently [10], [34].
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